

Interest Rate Futures


Robert Almgren



Market Microstructure
Dec 9, 2010

QB = Algorithmic Execution

SELL 179 ZNU0 (Sept 2010 10-yr Treasury)



EDT time on Wed 28 Jul 2010

Produced by QB from CME and internal data 2

Algorithmic Execution + TCA (Example 2)

SELL 63 ZFZ0
(Dec 2010 5-yr Treasury)



Quantitative Brokers

Algo execution and cost measurement

No prop trading or market making

Interest rate products, starting with futures

Equities already well served

Currently live with futures on CME

Value add is microstructure expertise

1. The products
2. Pro rata matching algorithms
3. Treasury roll
4. LDB data set

I. Interest rate futures products

Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)

US Treasury futures

Eurodollar futures

Fed Funds

London International Financial Futures (LIFFE)

Euribor, Euroswiss, Euroyen, *etc*

Short Sterling

Gilt

Eurex

Bund, Bobl, Schatz

Futures are not securities

Regulated by CFTC not SEC (US)

primary purpose is information dissemination

Defined and owned by exchanges

no fragmentation (many attempts)

exchanges have much more central role

microstructure is much more important

Almost all trading is now electronic

very good market data

CME US Treasury futures

| | Min deliv | Max deliv | ADV (`000) |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| 2-yr note | 1.9 yr | 2 yr | 342 |
| 3-yr note | 2.9 yr | 3 yr | 0 |
| 5-yr note | 4.2 yr | 5.3 yr | 741 |
| 10-yr note | 6.6 yr | 10 yr | 1468 |
| Bond (30 yr) | 15 yr | 25 yr | 469 |
| Ultra bond | 25 yr | -- | 92 |

Short position has choice of security and date

conversion factor to approximate 6% yield

Cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) embedded option

Treasury futures trading

Quarterly expirations (Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec)

front month is only liquid one (Roll event)

Price quotes relative to par, with 32nds

e.g. 118-15+ = \$118 + 15.5/32

Tick size 1/4, 1/2, or 1 32nd

Notional \$100k: 1/32 = \$31.25

(brokerage commissions ~\$1-2)

CME Eurodollar futures

Eurodollar = dollar deposit outside US (1956)

“Euro” = “foreign”

Eurodollar futures on CME since 1981

first cash-settled futures contract

Forward bet on changes in LIBOR rate

9950 = 99.50 = LIBOR at 1.50%/yr

Delivery amt is 3-month interest on \$1MM

9950 → 9951 (1 bp) = \$25 gain

Tick size is 1/2 bp = \$12.50

Inherently multidimensional

Quarterly expirations to 10 yrs (+ serials)

40 contracts, 10-15 active

All are short-term rates: very correlated

Spread contracts

Calendar spreads: +1 Jun, -1 Dec

Butterflies: +1 Jun, -2 Sep, +1 Dec

Treasury inter-commodity: +8 5-yr, -5 10-yr

Additional modeling features

implied liquidity

cointegration

2. Pro rata matching

How market orders are matched to limit


Algorithm fixed by exchange

to attract more volume


to attract correct mix of participants

etc

First-in first-out (FIFO) order matching



Pro rata order matching



Incoming volume divided
among *all* resting orders
at best price

Reasons for pro rata matching:

- Historical tradition from pit trading

- Encourage submission of large limit orders

- Allow late entrants to participate

Characteristic of interest rate futures markets

- Eurodollar, Euribor, Treasury calendar spreads


- Short sterling

“Arms race” to oversize limit orders

- limited only by risk of overfilling

- Jonathan Field & Jeremy Large 2008

Interest rate futures typically have pro rata matching, large resting liquidity, and large tick size



“Pro-Rata Matching and One-Tick Futures Markets,”
preprint 2007-08, Jonathan Field (Man Investments) and
Jeremy Large (Oxford-Man Institute and Man Investments)

Optimal strategy is to oversize

CME Eurodollar pro rata

1. First order at new level is filled first
when filled, no new order
2. Remaining volume is allocated pro rata
volumes rounded down to integral trade size
0-lots and 1-lots rounded down to zero
3. Remaining volume is allocated FIFO

1. Orders placed during the “pre-opening” or at the indicative opening price (IOP) will be matched on a price and time priority basis. **Note that implied orders are not taken into consideration, as they are only active during the continuous trading session.**
2. Priority is assigned to an order that betters the market, i.e. a new buy order at 36 betters a 35 bid. Only one order per side of the market (buy side and sell side) can have this TOP order priority. There will be situations where a TOP order doesn't exist for one or both sides of the market (for example, an order betters the market, but is then canceled). There will never be a situation that results in two orders on the same side of the market having TOP order status.
3. Only outright orders can be TOP orders, however the TOP orders of underlying orders that are creating implied orders will be taken into consideration during the matching process so as not to violate the TOP order rule in any market.
4. TOP orders are matched first, regardless of size.
5. After a TOP order is filled, Pro Rata Allocation is applied to the remainder of the resting orders at the applicable price levels until the incoming order is filled.
6. The Pro Rata algorithm allocates fills based upon each resting order's percentage representation of total volume at a given price level. For example, an order that makes up 30% of the total volume resting at a price will receive approximately 30% of all executions that occur at that price. Approximate fill percentages may occur because allocated decimal quantities are always rounded down (i.e. a 10-lot order that receives an allocation of 7.89- lots will be rounded down to 7-lots).
7. The Pro Rata algorithm will only allocate to resting orders that will receive 2 or more contracts.
8. After percentage allocation, all remaining contracts not previously allocated due to rounding considerations are allocated to the remaining orders on a FIFO basis.
 - Outright orders will have priority over implied orders and will be allocated the remaining quantity according to their timestamps.
 - Implied orders will be then allocated by maturity, with the earliest expiration receiving the allocation before the later expiring contracts. If spread contracts have the same expiration (i.e., CONTRACT A-CONTRACT B and CONTRACT A-CONTRACT C), then the quantity will be allocated to the earliest maturing contracts making up that spread (i.e., the CONTRACT A-CONTRACT B will get the allocation before the CONTRACT A-CONTRACT C because the CONTRACT B expires before the CONTRACT C).

Consequences of pro rata matching

Massive oversizing of limit orders

“arms race” in competition for liquidity
limited only by risk tolerance


Incentive for marketable limit orders

become new TOP order



Rapid variations on limit order size

no penalty for cancellation and resubmission

Eurodollar market data




Variations in quote size




CDT time on Mon 01 Nov 2010


Avg Posted Liquidity: Eurodollar Futures



Average Trade Size: Eurodollars




Trade volumes vary much less




Eurodollars




Avg Posted Liquidity: Treasury Futures



Average Trade Size: Treasuries



Trade volume: Treasuries



How much pro rata, how much FIFO?

Jianhong Wang, NYU MMF 2010

Depends on limit order size distribution

uniform order size: more FIFO volume

large and small orders: more pro rata

LIFFE IR matching (pre July 2010)

Pro-rata, weighted by sequence number

Optimal strategy is to split limit order:

one large order, plus

many small 1-lot orders

If all traders are symmetric size,

optimal size is golden ratio

Karel Janeček and Martin Kabrhel (RSJ Invest)

“Matching algorithms of international exchanges”

preprint Dec 2007

LIFFE Euribor “time pro rata”

1. First order at new level is filled first
when filled, no new order
2. Remaining volume is allocated
by pro rata *weighted* by preceding volume
volumes rounded down to integral trade size
0-lots rounded up to one
3. Remaining volume is allocated

Purpose

encourage small traders
reduce transient quotes

2. Treasury roll event

Who trades with whom?
Role of market makers


Futures open interest

time

Open interest = 0

Open interest = 1

Open interest = 0



Roll

Open interest

A

B

Dec

Mar

long 1 Dec short 1 Dec

1

0

sell \longrightarrow buy

Dec-Mar calendar spread

long 1 Mar short 1 Mar

0

1

If position holder trades with position holder, then
1 spread prints for each 1 change in open interest

Roll 2: via market maker

A

MM

B

long 1 Dec

flat

short 1 Dec

sell → buy
Dec-Mar calendar spread

sell → buy
Dec-Mar calendar spread


long 1 Mar

flat

short 1 Mar

If position holders trade with intermediaries, then 2 spreads print for each 1 change in open interest

Transfer of open interest




Ratio of spread volume to open interest measures efficiency

Ratio near 1: open interest moves via direct trades

Ratio near 2: open interest moves via intermediaries


ZN: Average across 10 rolls March 2008 to June 2010

Historical evolution of volume ratio



4. LDB data set

How to measure market impact of trades?



What is a buy or a sell?

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I. Public market data:

trade at ask = buy, at bid = sell

liquidity demanders try to act like providers

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market impact of our client population

dependent on details of data set

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3. CME LDB:

market participants labelled by type

estimate temporary and permanent impact

Customer Trade Indicator (CTI) code

1. Exchange local trading for own account
market maker
2. Member firm trading for own account
bank proprietary trading desk
3. Local trading for other's account
(almost no volume -- merge with CTI I)
4. External firm
liquidity demander

CME Liquidity Data Bank (LDB)

For Treasury outright since Jan 2009

CME Liquidity Data Bank (LDB)

For Treasury outright since Jan 2009

For each 15-minute interval

CME Liquidity Data Bank (LDB)

For Treasury outright since Jan 2009

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For each trade price level

CME Liquidity Data Bank (LDB)

For Treasury outrights since Jan 2009

For each 15-minute interval

For each trade price level

→ Buy and sell volume for each CTI category


CTI example

Dec 2010 10-year Treasury
Nov 1, 2010, 10:00 to 10:15 Chicago


- CTI 1
- CTI 2
- CTI 3
- CTI 4

Average
sell prices


Average
buy prices




Market data



Average price difference -- 15 min






Average price difference -- daily






Market impact estimates

Feb 2009




Price change
(32nds)

Nov 2010



Net trade volume (thousands)

Correlation in order flow



Conclusions

1. Market details are important
2. Futures have different and interesting properties
3. Can get insight into market properties

Disclaimer

This document contains examples of hypothetical performance. Hypothetical performance results have many inherent limitations, some of which are described below. No representation is being made that any account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those shown. In fact, there are frequently sharp differences between hypothetical performance results and the actual results subsequently achieved by any particular trading program.

One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the impact of financial risk in actual trading. For example, the ability to withstand losses or to adhere to a particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are numerous other factors related to the markets in general or to the implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully accounted for in the preparation of hypothetical performance results and all of which can adversely affect actual trading results.

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